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SECURITY INFORMATION

25 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Debriefing of General McClure in Mr. Wissner's Office,
Thursday, 24 July 1952 25X1A

PRESENT : Mr. Wissner; General McClure; [REDACTED]

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(PT DIVISION)

1. General McClure covered some of the covert aspects of his findings which were not discussed at his POGC debriefing. In summary, he finds the organizational structure in Korea all wrong and is recommending a change whereby one general officer is completely in charge of all unconventional warfare and has a joint staff with equal representation from Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. The present arrangement has dual relationships and is pretty much under the dominance of C-2, which puts a priority on intelligence collection over psychological activities. Without this type organization which he was recommending to the Army Chief of Staff, there would be considerable duplication of equipment and activities.

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2. With respect to plans [REDACTED], General McClure indicated that Apex G (the covert annex) was never transmitted to the field in the military channel until just recently, and, consequently, the field took only cognizance of official JCS directives; therefore, they are not in a position to answer CIA's queries. With respect to equipment and personnel, General McClure stated that the CIA Senior Representative had stated to him informally that he saw no need for the equipment and personnel set forth in the annexes to the CIA plans in Korea, particularly since he had just recently acquired a printing press for his own work. General McClure stated to the group that he, himself, saw no need for a great part of the equipment and personnel which was an organic Army T/O unit and was available in the field for this type of work if the request was placed upon them. It was pointed out to him

that this


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that this plan was conceived in December 1951 and was to be used for the mutual support of either [redacted] the latter case in which [redacted] CIA had a 90% responsibility to cover activity, as in contrast to [redacted] 25X1A [redacted], whereby the military would have the major responsibility. 25X1A

3. After the departure of General McClure, Mr. Wissner discussed the matter with the remaining personnel, and a determination was made that in the light of the recent situation, the findings of General McClure, and the Director's desire to not over extend CIA's capabilities, the request for logistical and personnel support to the Department of Defense would be withheld and that upon the suggestion of Mr. Fitzgerald the plans would be returned to the Division for review and revision.

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Psychological Staff Division

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